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SURVEY OF WASHINGTON LAW
in the principal case, but it also would foster a flexibility which could
prove to be advantageous in the future.
APPLICABILITY OF REAL ESTATE SALES TAX TO
TRANSFERS FOR BENEFIT OF UNFORMED
CORPORATION
A corporate promoter entered into an earnest money agreement
which contemplated corporate purchase of real property. At the
planned closing date, the incorporation process was incomplete. To
avoid losing the property, the promoter entered into a real estate con-
tract naming himself and two nominees as purchaser-trustees to hold
the property in trust for the benefit of the proposed corporation. The
one-percent real estate sales tax1 was paid by the seller, since the trans-
fer to the trustees constituted a sale.2 One month later, the beneficiary
was incorporated. Pursuant to the trust agreement, the trustees trans-
ferred the property to the corporation by quitclaim deeds executed
separately by each trustee for nominal consideration. King County
assessed an identical tax upon this transfer, contending that it was a
second sale. The trustees, who were incorporators, paid the tax under
protest, claiming double assessment, and brought action to recover the
tax. On appeal, judgment for plaintiffs was affirmed. Held: Where
an earnest money agreement for purchase of real property expressly
contemplates that the purchaser will be a corporation, and the incor-
porators accept title in trust since the incorporation process is incom-
plete, the subsequent conveyance of title from the incorporators to
the beneficiary corporation is not a "sale" and hence not a taxable
event for purposes of the transfer tax. Senfour Investment Co. v. King
County, 66 Wash. Dec. 2d 61,401 P.2d 319 (1965).
The sales tax statute provides that: "the term 'sale' shall have its
ordinary meaning and shall include any conveyance ... for a valuable
consideration, and any contract for such conveyance. ... "' The im-
port of these provisions is that application of the tax depends upon the
transfer of an interest in land for valuable consideration. In Deer Park
Pine Indus. v. Stevens County,4 the court held that, since stockholders
X'VAsH. REv. CODE § 28.45.050 (1963) provides: The county commissioners of
any county are authorized by ordinance to levy an excise tax upon sales of real
estate not exceeding one per cent of the selling price.
-VAsH. REv. CODE § 28.45.010 (1963).
'WAsH. REv. CoDE§ 28.45.010 (1963).
'46 Wn. 2d 852, 286 P.2d 98 (1955).
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had a pre-existing right to corporate assets upon dissolution, transfer
of realty by a trustee in liquidation was not a taxable event within the
meaning of the sales tax provisions. It was further held, however, that
the transferees' assumption of the liabilities of the dissolved corpora-
tion constituted valuable consideration, and there was a pro tanto tax-
able event for purposes of the sales tax.5 It was subsequently held, in
Doric Co. v. King County,' that when corporate liabilities exist upon
dissolution, but shareholders do not expressly agree to assume them,
there is no consideration for the transfer and hence no taxable event.7
In the principal case, it was stipulated that the original sale to the
trustees was a taxable event. Holding that a valid trust was created by
that transfer,' the court reasoned that the conveyance from the trust-
ees to the corporation was simply the mechanical performance of the
trust obligation. Citing Deer Park, the court concluded that such a
transfer does not constitute a sale in its "ordinary meaning," with the
result that there was no taxable event.
In reaching its conclusion, the court rejected King County's conten-
tion that nominal consideration for the second transfer is sufficient to
meet the statutory requirement of a sale. This result is consonant
In Deer Park Pine Indus. v. Stevens County, supra note 4, the court observed that,
although shareholders have a pre-existing right to share in the assets upon disso-
lution-a right acquired upon purchase of stock-creditors have a paramount right to
corporate assets, citing Taylor v. Interstate Inv. Co., 75 Wash. 490, 135 Pac. 240
(1913). Thus, the court reasoned, when shareholders assume corporate liabilities they,
in effect, purchase the real property from the creditors, and this constitutes considera-
tion which is to that extent a "sale" under WAsH. REV. CODE § 28.45.010 (1963).
357 Wn. 2d 640, 358 P.2d 972 (1961), 37 WASH. L. REv. 219 (1962).
No doubt relying upon Deer Park, the shareholder did not expressly assume the
corporate debt, but took real estate subject to creditor's security interest. Even
though the amount of debt secured was more than half the value of the asset, the
court concluded that the conveyance was not for valuable consideration and that,
thus, there was no taxable event. See 37 WASH. L. Rav. 219, 223 & nn. 22-24 (1962).8 Defendant contended that a trustee cannot hold property for a cestui which is
not in being at the time the trust is established. Brief for Appellant, p. 17. Rejecting
this contention, and relying upon Bruun v. Hanson, 103 F.2d 685 (9th Cir. 1939),
the court held that a valid trust was created by the nominees and that it is not
necessary that the beneficiary be in existence at the time of the creation of the
trust. Accord, 1 RESTATEmENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 112, comment e (1959). The
Restatement also states that such a trust is valid only if the corporation will be
definitely organized within the period of the rule against perpetuities. Id. § 112.
See 2 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 112.2 (2d ed. 1956).
Defendant's contention is based on the idea that, to have a trust at any given time,
there must be normal trust consequences at that time, including the existence of the
beneficiary. This view has been used to some extent in income tax cases. E.g.,
Morsman v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 18 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 701 (1937),
holding a trust for unborn children invalid where the settlor was also the trustee.
The better view, however, is that to have a trust at any given time, there need be
only the possibility of normal trust consequences without further action by the
settlor, the lack of such action being the controlling question. See generally 2 ScoTT,
TRUSTS § 112.1 (2d ed. 1956). A leading case tacitly employing this approach is
Folk v. Hughes, 100 S.C. 220, 84 S.E. 713 (1915), recognizing the validity of a
trust for the benefit of unborn children.
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with the tenet that "the essence of a 'transfer' [for purposes of taxa-
tion] is the passage of control over the economic benefits of property
rather than any technical changes in its title."9 The result is further
supported by the fact that the incorporators were the shareholders of
the corporation, a fact indicative of control remaining static.
Recitation of nominal consideration in quitclaim deeds is desirable
as a factor in insuring irrevocability."0 To hold that such recitation is
sufficient to assess a second tax would be to ignore the fact that nothing
given by the trustees had been bargained for. As the distribution in
Deer Park was in satisfaction of the pre-existing rights of the share-
holders, so the transfer in the principal case was in satisfaction of the
pre-existing right of the transferee corporation. In neither case was
there the bargained-for consideration required by the statute.
Since transfers of real property can be accomplished without even
nominal consideration, to regard the payment of such consideration as
sufficient for purposes of the excise tax would accomplish nothing
beyond creating a trap for the unwary. Plaintiffs, for example, could
have avoided the possibility of their transaction falling within the pro-
visions of the transfer tax statute by originally taking the property in
fee, and making a gift of it to the corporation" after acquisition of a
few shares of corporate stock. Clearly, the court was correct in its
refusal to foster the development of a situation in which the question
of imposition of a tax would depend upon the form of the transfer,
without regard to its substance.
ASSUMPTION OF RISK-BASIS FOR DENIAL OF
RECOVERY?
A recent decision of the Washington Supreme Court casts consider-
able doubt on the exact status of the defense of assumption of risk, and
illustrates a serious problem concerning the judicial process in Wash-
ington. The action was brought against a school district for injuries
Sanford's Estate v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39, 43 (1939) (dictum).
" A conveyance is not a contract, although it results from an agreement, and
consideration is not necessary in a deed unless it operates under the Statute of Uses.
Most conveyances, however, recite at least nominal consideration in order to rebut
the reservation of an equitable estate in favor of the grantor and to furnish support
for the conveyance as a bargain and sale. Such acknowledgement is conclusive upon
the parties for the purpose of supporting the conveyance. See generally TIFFANY,
REAL PROrERTY 680 & nn. 59, 61-64 (new abr. ed. 1940), and cases cited therein.
" WASH. REv. CODE § 28.45.010 (1963) provides that the term "sale" "shall not
include a transfer by gift, devise, or inheritance...."
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